Why I'm Not an Atheist!!

Religion's trump card is our inability to explain 'First Cause'. Since any suggested explanation will always encounter the infinite regress objection, I don't believe that science will ever explain how something came from nothing. If all the religions agreed to drop their scriptures and fairy-stories and simply regard God as the unknowable 'First Cause', in this sense, I would no longer be an atheist. Does anyone else feel the same way?

THE ‘DRIVERS’ OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

Social psychology is concerned primarily with human behaviour and emotions. Behaviour is simply what we do. My dictionary defines it, curtly, as “How we conduct ourselves” but that implies that we are always in conscious control of our behaviour and we all know that this isn’t the case.  I will say more about this later in the note. Our behaviour is externally observable whereas emotions are how we feel; they are experiential. They cannot be experienced externally although their existence in an individual can sometimes, wittingly or unwittingly, become apparent to others, e.g. blushing, facial expressions. This paper addresses behaviour rather than any concomitant emotions. It therefore sidesteps the complications that would be introduced by a consideration of the emotions and the interaction between behaviour and emotions. The subject of social psychology is also concerned both with ‘normal’, healthy behaviour and with pathological behaviour. This note focuses on healthy behaviour. However, the issues it raises are just as relevant to the study of pathological behaviour.

The question under consideration in this note is “What are the root causes, or ‘drivers’ of our behaviour?”  This is clearly a seminal issue for social psychology. A clear exposition would have the potential, not just to clarify and provide an analysis of the determinants of behaviour, but also to integrate a number of disparate approaches to the subject of psychology itself. Both the theory and practice of social psychology is bedevilled by schisms euphemistically called ‘perspectives’. For example, we have biological psychology that concentrates on the role of genes/ hormones in generating behaviour, social-constructionist psychology that emphasizes social and cultural factors in accounting for it, the psycho-dynamic (notably Freudian) approach that majors on early nurturing in explaining behaviour, cognitive psychology centred mainly on the role of attention/ cognition and humanistic psychology that considers the role of human free-will in regulating behaviour. Some psychologists regard themselves as just that; ‘psychologists’. Many more in my experience will use an epithet to qualify their professional descriptor; Freudian psychologist, humanistic psychologist, cognitive psychologist, etc. Pity the poor client looking for assistance from a psychologist! She doesn’t know or care about the particular epistemology favoured by the practitioner, she just wants help from someone qualified to diagnose and treat an unwanted psychological condition. In passing I would suggest that the profession would do well to move towards greater integration in this regard.

If this is to happen, we need more integrated hypotheses, theories and experimentation. The only relevant work I am currently aware of is called ‘Trimodal theory’ and is described in Stevens (1998). The author distinguishes three ‘bases (or sources) for action’; biological processes, symbolic processes and reflexive awareness. He relates these to a number of perspectives. For example, he notes that both social constructionism and psychoanalysis depend on symbolic processes to provide a basis for action. He concludes that “  --  Given the argument here that human personal and social life involves a mixture of all three sources, this would imply that we need a broad range of perspectives in order to represent all three modes, and that such perspectives are therefore to be regarded as essentially complementary rather than mutually exclusive.” From my previous comments you will be able to anticipate that I agree enthusiastically with this latter conclusion. I believe Richard Stevens is right; the perspectives do relate to “bases for action”. I would add, however, that they often operate concurrently.

The Drivers

Using a physical analogy, I hypothesize that the individual drivers are like a set of forces acting on an object. In physics, the resulting direction and velocity of the object is called the 'resultant' of the contributory forces. In the same way, behaviour may be thought of as the resultant of a number of these drivers that may be acting on the individual. Any particular behaviour will be the resultant of one or more drivers. Drivers may act positively, encouraging action, or negatively, inhibiting action. What are these drivers? The following seven are proposed:-

Biological

1. Genetically mediated propensities

Propensities to express certain types of behaviour are the result of basic, common human drives (e.g. to assuage hunger, sexual desire etc) together with other psychological propensities that arise from particular gene/allele patterns.

2. Concurrent somatic condition

Behaviour will be affected by concurrent hormonal levels and the general somatic condition.

Social

3. Behaviour patterns learned from early nurturing relationships

Psycho-dynamic (Freudian) factors including ego defences.

4. Relevant learned social/cultural norms

The recognised norms within the culture and social 'milieu' in which the behaviour takes place.

Cognitive

5. Cognitively developed patterns of behaviour

Stereotypic attitudes that provide cognitive short-cuts to formulaic patterns of behaviour. These may have been 'inherited' from primary carers or from exposure to particular social representations during development. 

6. Free cognition

Free-thinking from basic principles and the detail of the particular situation. 

7. Reflexive consideration 

Critical reconsideration of past thoughts, feelings and actions.

An example will illustrate some of the points made.
I am walking down a crowded Oxford Street in London; on the pavement but close to the kerb. A man walking toward me does not appear to be giving me any room to pass. I don't think it's safe to step into the road so I push back at him as we collide and say, in a loud voice, "Why don't you look where you're going?" A few yards on I look back, and, for the first time, and to my horror and acute embarrassment, see he is carrying a white stick. I shout my apology and hope he hears me. Before I fall asleep that night I resolve to be more circumspect before losing my rag in future.
Walking down Oxford Street can be stressful and it is highly likely that my active stress hormones, such as adrenelin and cortisol, will be above ambient levels in the hypothetical scenario described above. If this is so, the 'Somatic' driver (Driver 2) will have played a part in my initial, somewhat aggressive reaction. The genetically mediated 'fight or flight' response (Driver 1) would also have played a part in this reaction. A Driver 1 component can be fast-acting and difficult to control; as in this case. It is also possible that a 'Cognitive Pattern', (Driver 5) was a component; e.g. "I won't be intimidated by inconsiderate walkers!"
My feelings of shame and embarrassment and my shouted apology when I see that the gentleman is blind, will have been generated from Driver 4, 'Social Norms' acting with Driver 6, 'Free Cognition'; while my nocturnal resolution to ensure that I have all the facts before engaging my big mouth would have involved 'Free Cognition', again, and 'Reflexive Consideration' (Driver 7). 
It is interesting to note that, at the time that the behaviour occurs, the model suggests that the only driver under full conscious control is ‘Free Cognition’ (Driver 6). I would suggest that this provides a possible answer to the time honoured question about the contribution of “freewill” to our behaviour. The possibility of engaging ‘Reflexive Consideration’ (Driver 7) at some later time is another aspect of freewill that enables us to modify relevant, subjective ‘Cognitive Patterns’ (Driver 5) and hence learn from our experience.

Conclusions

In this short paper I have suggested a model for approaching the aetiology of human behaviour. It may well need discussion and amendment. However, I believe that it makes a useful start and contend that the need for such a model is overwhelming in order to integrate the existing approaches to the discipline of psychology. As it stands, the various flavours – cognitive, psycho-analytic, humanistic etc are a source of confusion for our clients and a source of unnecessary discord within the profession.
It also suggests an answer to the question about how much free-will we have in the manifestation of our behaviour.

Reference.

Stevens, R (1998), ‘Trimodal theory as a model for interrelating perspectives in psychology’. In Sapsford, R (ed.), Issues for Social Psychology, Open University.



John Jacob Lyons, 17 Jan. 2012

CONSCIOUSNESS: TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE ‘HARD PROBLEM’?

The “hard problem of consciousness” was formulated by David J Chalmers in 1996. Simply stated it concerns the issues; what is consciousness; why do we have it and how do patterns of neuronal firing in the brain generate the subjective experience of being conscious?

I think of consciousness quite simply as our subjective awareness of ourselves, our surroundings and the relationship between these two entities. I believe that consciousness evolved because it provided an adaptive integrated model of reality from the, individually evolved, sensory inputs we are able to receive from outside the body and from the body itself. Such a model is adaptive since it speeds up our evaluation of confirmatory/ contradictory evidence when making conscious decisions about the actions we need to take in response to the state of world and/or our physical needs. It is also an essential tool in making adaptive moral judgements. See Marc D Hauser, ‘Moral Minds’, p29.

In a moving, talking picture, the fact that the dynamic visual image is synchronized with the sound results in consilience between the words heard and the lip movements produced by the actors. This results in an emergent subjective experience that seems to the viewer to be an acceptable model of our usual real-life subjective model of reality. My hypothesis is that there is a similar relationship between our sensory inputs, which are, to all intents and purposes, also experienced in a synchronized fashion, and objective reality.

This emergent model of reality that we call ‘consciousness’ also enables us to take ‘snapshots’ of states of the world associated with emotionally charged experiences. These may then be stored in long-term memory and used, unconsciously, to pattern-match to real-time experiences and thus enable very fast, unconsciously mediated and adaptive actions to be generated when similar states of the world are encountered.

But how do we explain our subjective experience of being conscious in terms of its neurological basis? In other words, how do we explain the translation from a pattern of electro-chemical pulses in neural brain tissue to the subjective model of reality that we call our consciousness?  I have described consciousness as an integrated model of reality based on our sensory inputs. Since our experience of each of these inputs (sight, for example) is understood by science in terms of specific neuronal activity and the physiology of the sensory organs, the ‘hard problem’ seems to disappear when described in this way.

So, what is consciousness? It is a subjective model of reality. Why do we have it? We have it because it proved to be an adaptive facility that emerged spontaneously with the phylogenic development of the senses. How does neuronal activity generate subjective experience? Sensory input, the functionality of the sensory organs combined with appropriate neural activity generate synchronized sensory experiences that result in the subjective, integrated, emergent model of reality that we call ‘consciousness’. Where does this analysis leave the concept “unconsciousness”?

If one accepts the notion that neural activity mediates both my conscious processes such as deciding to write this note, and my unconscious processes, such as those controlling my somatic-homeostatic functions, I see no problem in hypothesizing that consciousness is a sub-set of brain processes. There appears to be constant movement, however, between the conscious sub-set and the unconscious sub-set; as when we suddenly become conscious that someone within ear-shot has mentioned our name. I accept that the explanation of consciousness I am putting forward in these notes leaves the neuronal source of ‘attention’, as yet, unexplained.

The question arises, “What distinguishes the conscious sub-set of neuronal activity from the unconscious sub-set?” I would hypothesize that the conscious sub-set is a logically distributed module within neuronal architecture that contains the results of synchronized sensory processing as previously described which has access to long-term memory/ reasoning and which allows input from emotional circuits. The unconscious sub-set also has access to emotional circuits in order to produce fast responses by pattern-matching. Any particular emotional event may, unconsciously, trigger a match with previous emotionally-laden memories. These memories will there-by be etched deeper. The emotion generated by the event will also be consciously experienced as ‘feeling’ thus allowing later reflection on the event, any action/inaction taken in response and the result.